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Abstract
The core of Nonaka and Takeuchi’s (1995) model of knowledge-creation is flawed
because of ambiguities in the conceptualization of knowledge, and tacit knowledge,
and their failure to specify clearly the nature of ‘explicit’ knowledge.  It is argued that
tacit knowledge must be viewed as irreducibly tacit, not specifiable in words, while
‘explicit knowledge’ is more accurately named ‘knowledge representations’.  On this
basis a new framework is proposed in which socialization, ‘externalization’ (renamed
‘representing’) and internalization are confirmed.  Nonaka and Takeuchi’s discussion
of these modes, however, fails to recognize the complex cognitive and social
processes involved.  ‘Combination’ is revealed as untenable, being either the iterative
linking of representing and internalization, or an entirely separable process -
information management.  A new model is presented which indicates knowledge
management has two important foci - managing cognitive processes, and managing
information.
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Introduction
Nonaka and his colleagues have argued that the creation of knowledge is a critical
dimension of knowledge management that other writers in this field have overlooked.
In order to remedy this they put forward a model of knowledge conversion as the
“engine” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995:57) of their model of organizational knowledge
creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; see also Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka et.al., 1996).
This has been widely cited (265 citations of The Knowledge-Creating Company, alone
in the Science and Social Science Citation indexes by March 2000) and forms the
basis of an important study of tacit knowledge in organizations (Baumard, 1999).
The model rests on the distinction between tacit and explicit knowledge, attributed to
Polanyi (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 8-11, 56, 59).  These terms will be discussed in
more detail below:  for the present we can note that tacit knowledge is based on
experience, and is not in words, while explicit knowledge is expressible in the form
words, numbers or other common symbols.  Their key assumption is that “knowledge
is created through the interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge” (Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995: 62).  This allows them to postulate four “modes” of knowledge
conversion - socialization, externalization, combination, and internalization (see
Figure 1) - as the “engine” of knowledge creation (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 70-90).
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Knowledge conversion proceeds in a spiral, from socialization through
externalization, combination, and internalization, and back to socialization again
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 70-73).  Socialization is the process through which
people share tacit knowledge.  Tacit knowledge can then be made explicit through
externalization, “a quintessential knowledge-creation process” whereby concepts are
formed and shared.  The next step in the knowledge creation spiral is combination - a
“process of systematizing concepts into a knowledge system” through meetings,
documentation, and so on.  Finally, internalization is the process of embodying
explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge, and is closely related to learning by doing
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 62-72).  Their examples of these modes of knowledge
conversion will be described and discussed in more detail later in this paper.
One difficulty with evaluating this model is the slightness of examples and empirical
data to support it.  The main presentation occupies no more than nine pages (Nonaka
& Takeuchi, 1995: 61-70) although some details are given later in the book, and other
papers (Nonaka, 1994; Nonaka et.al., 1996) cover similar ground.  None of the ‘case
studies’ covers more than a page or two, and there is little attempt to describe the
actual processes of transfer or transformation.  They claimed (Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995: 91) that the four knowledge conversion modes were validated by a survey of
managers (Nonaka et.al., 1994).  While this report is suggestive, it is difficult to
escape the conclusion that if you develop measures of four constructs and ask
respondents to answer questions designed to measure these constructs, statistical
analysis will reveal their presence.
Engeström (1999) has also drawn attention to the lack of empirical support for their
model.  He carried out detailed ethnographic studies of “innovative learning”
(equivalent to knowledge creation) and evaluated their model on this basis.  He notes
their model takes as given the problem to be worked on. His studies, however, lead
him to suggest that formulating a problem and analysing and systematically locating
the problem are key innovation processes that Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model fails to
identify or encompass (Engeström, 1999: 380, 388-90).
These are serious criticisms that anyone wishing to use Nonaka and Takeuchi’s model
to understand the innovation and learning aspects of knowledge management  must
take into account.  In this paper, however, my concerns are with more fundamental
issues.  It is my contention that the core of their model is flawed. If the “engine” is
cracked, then the validity of the rest of the model must also be called into question.
At the heart of their model are the notions and distinctions of tacit and explicit
knowledge.  We will begin our critique by examining those concepts in some detail.
Tacit knowledge
In this section I first review Nonaka and Takeuchi’s account of tacit knowledge, based
principally on The Knowledge-Creating Company (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995).  I then
consider Polanyi’s views and finally draw attention to discussions of tacit knowledge
and work that took place in Sweden in the 1980s.  This provides the basis on which to
evaluate Nonaka and Takeuchi’s account.
Nonaka and Takeuchi
They acknowledged Polanyi’s The Tacit Dimension (1966) as the source of their
primary concepts, tacit and explicit knowledge but claimed to go beyond his
formulation to develop the more practical side of the concept.  They described tacit
knowledge as highly personal and context specific, deeply rooted in individual
experiences, ideas, values and emotions.  Because of this it is hard to formalize,
process systematically, or to communicate or share.  Indeed, it is a form of knowledge
that does not take linguistic or numerical shape (they did not specify the form more
positively, but described it in contrast to explicit knowledge) but, they claimed, has to
be converted into those forms in order to be communicated.  Two forms of tacit
knowledge were distinguished - technical, and cognitive.  By technical, they meant
crafts and skills or concrete ‘know-how’.  Cognitive tacit knowledge, on the other
hand, was described as being ingrained schema, beliefs and mental models that are
taken for granted.  Mental models giving rise to individuals’ ‘images’ of what is or
what ought to be are central elements of the cognitive dimension (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995: 8, 9, 59-60).  
While this description of tacit knowledge is relatively straightforward, Nonaka and
Takeuchi’s account of how it is created leaves room for confusion.  On the one hand
they emphasized that tacit knowledge is created by or through individual’s actions and
direct experience in the ‘here and now’ (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 8, 10, 60, 85).
Thus tacit knowledge can be acquired through a master-apprentice relationship, or
learning by doing, and does not require the use of language (Nonaka & Takeuchi
1995: 62-3, 70, 85; Nonaka et.al., 1994: 340).  In this context they referred to
Polanyi’s concept of “indwelling” that sought to capture how people create knowledge
by involving themselves with objects, and knowing it by tacitly integrating objects’
particularities (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 60).
On the other hand, they also described the transfer or acquisition of tacit knowledge
by other quite different processes.  Two of their three examples of “socialization”
clearly involve talking despite their statement that the tacit is a non-linguistic form of
knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 9).  They claimed that a team ‘brainstorming
camp’ involving social activity and informal discussion of work problems was a
particularly effective method for reorienting people’s mental models - the cognitive
dimension of tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 62-3). Elsewhere they
asserted that tacit knowledge can be acquired through ‘internalization’ whereby an
individual uses explicit knowledge in the form of documents and similar media to
generate tacit knowledge.  In particular they claimed that the use of documentation
(i.e. reading) also facilitates changing mental models (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 69).
There may be some order to their remarks in so far as they portray the technical form
of tacit knowledge as being shaped and acquired through experience, and the
cognitive form through talk and reading. However, they do not explicitly make this
distinction and it is difficult to see why such an important difference could arise.
Their account could be read as implying two forms of tacit knowledge, one not
transmissible through words, and one through words.  This would be difficult to
sustain as knowledge in the form of words is explicit, not tacit.  Another interpretation
would imply two other forms of tacit knowledge:  one not transmissible by linguistic
or other symbolic means, and one that can easily be expressed in words, but currently
is not, and therefore is tacit by default.  Whatever the case, their account is confusing
and ambiguous.  (Discussion of the function words might perform in tacit to tacit
knowledge transfer follows in a later section.)
Michael Polanyi
It is sometimes claimed that Polanyi introduced the concept of tacit knowledge
(Prosch, 1973: 201; Barbiero 2000), although Wagner and Sternberg (1986) cite a
definition from the Oxford English Dictionary of 1933. The philosopher of science
Rom Harré (1977, 1982) said that Polanyi’s concept was “profoundly important”, but
pointed out that Polanyi used the term ambiguously - a charge Polanyi’s supporters
deny (Scott, 1982).
Polanyi began with the proposition that there are two kinds of awareness - focal, and
subsidiary (Grene, 1969: ix; Polanyi, 1969a, 128).  Focal awareness could be termed
“knowledge by attending to”, and subsidiary awareness “knowledge by relying on”
(Grene, 1969: ix).  In terms of visual perception, the equivalent terms would be
‘looking at’ and ‘seeing’, but the terms focal, and subsidiary, are of wider application
(Polanyi, 1969a: 128).  He stressed that these are not two degrees but two kinds of
awareness (Polanyi, 1969a:128).  They are present in every kind perceptual situation
(visual, haptic, auditory, and so on).
The significance of his distinction was made clear in a series of examples, framed
around discussion of the problem of how we perceive ‘wholes’ or entities through
perceiving many particulars; and how we identify particulars by virtue of their being
perceived as parts of a whole.  Thus aerial photographs reveal archaeological remains
clearly, while on the ground what were previously just bumps and hollows are
revealed as the ‘particulars’ of an archaeological site.  Similarly, medical diagnosis
proceeds through an interplay between attending to particulars, integrating them into
wholes, and attending back to the particulars again (Polanyi, 1969a: 123-8).  In
general, he concluded, recognition of a whole depends on seeing and integrating the
parts, but if they themselves are focused on, this process itself prevents you from
recognizing the whole of which they are part. This semantic dimension of tacit
knowing (Grene, 1969: xiv; Polanyi, 1966: 12-13) directs attention from particulars to
the whole they signify.  Thus Polanyi claimed that “all knowledge is fundamentally
tacit, as ... it rests on our subsidiary awareness of particulars in terms of a
comprehensive entity” (Polanyi, 1969a:133), and elsewhere: “All knowledge falls into
one of these two classes: it is either tacit or rooted in tacit knowledge” (Polanyi,
1969c: 195).
Polanyi’s aphorism “we can know more than we can tell” (e.g. Polanyi, 1966: 4) is
often cited in discussion of tacit knowledge, but the meaning he intended it to convey
is seldom remarked upon.  It is, however, central to his concept of tacit knowledge or
tacit knowing. In one article he strongly implied that a cyclist turning a corner
maintains his or her balance by tacitly knowing the formula relating angle of
imbalance, radius of curve, and velocity (Polanyi, 1969b: 144).  In The Tacit
Dimension (1966) he provided two commentaries that develop this idea.  First, he
described psychological experiments in which subjects were shown nonsense
syllables, and given an electric shock after some of them.  Subjects later showed
detectable signs of anticipating a shock when the key syllables appeared but although
they were aware of anticipating a shock, they could not say why they were aware
(Polanyi, 1966: 7-8).  These reports were of early investigations of subception,
subsequently called implicit learning (Polanyi, 1969b: 144-45; Reber, 1993: 17, 68-9).
The second example is also a crucial illustration for Polanyi (1966: 21-3).  Here he
discussed ‘seeing a problem’ in the context of scientific research - and his discussion
could be applied to business problem formulation as well.  A problem is by definition
hidden, and he claimed that seeing a problem is “to have an intimation of the
coherence of hitherto not comprehended particulars” (Polanyi, 1966:21).  If this
‘intimation’ is a good one, i.e. is “true” then we have a good problem.  Polanyi noted
this situation is identical with the classical philosophical problem (Meno’s paradox)
of the impossibility of searching for the solution to a problem since a search implies
knowledge of what is being sought.  He concluded that we can recognize a statement
(i.e. a problem) as true by appreciating the wealth of its as yet undisclosed
consequences “if we admit that we can have a tacit foreknowledge of yet
undiscovered things.” (Polanyi, 1966:23).  
He justified this argument by claiming that human beings have a “competence for
comprehending unspecifiable entities, which will yet reveal themselves in the future”
(Polanyi, 1969a: 133).  As a practical illustration of his intention he referred to the
connection between Copernicus and Newton in the following way: “The true meaning
of the heliocentric system was discovered by Newton, but it was anticipated 140 years
earlier by Copernicus.” (Polanyi, 1969a:133).  What Polanyi claimed here was that if
someone (e.g. Copernicus) had an idea that was later shown by someone else (e.g.
Newton) to have implied more than had previously been considered or explicitly
realised, then the first person had ‘known more than he could tell’, due to his
competence for ‘comprehending entities that would reveal themselves in the future’.
For Polanyi, then, tacit knowledge referred to several things.  First, it referred to the
particulars of a focal entity; second, it was the base of knowledge if not itself all
knowledge; third, tacit knowledge is hidden from the knowing person; and finally, it
is “foreknowledge”.  The latter sense perhaps reflects the religious elements of his
thought that he retained as he grew older (Tiles, 1992: 9).  Baumard (1999: 60)
discusses foreknowledge in organizations, but though lacking detail, his example
seems to be of one where a group or individual is concealing what they know from
others, for some reason or purpose.  This kind of “foreknowledge” is not the same as
that which Polanyi referred to which is more akin to knowing the future.
While the issue of tacit foreknowledge may be difficult to accept, and it is certainly
not easy to see its relevance to knowledge management, there is a more fundamental
problem with Polanyi’s argument. He granted that we can have specified (i.e. explicit)
knowledge of a focal entity or whole.  This entity will have particulars which will
remain tacit, so long as the entity itself is the focus of attention.  We can however shift
our attention to a particular of our original entity.  This particular would then become
our focal whole, and in turn it will have tacitly known particulars.  They too can be
attended to in turn, and so on.  After pursuing each of the original entity’s particulars
it can be ‘reconstructed’, and, as Polanyi said, this “recovery” will change and may
even improve on the original meaning (Polanyi, 1966: 18-19; see also Polanyi 1969a).
Furthermore, given that our original focal entity is a particular of a yet larger entity,
‘sister’ entities can also be identified, and so perhaps, ultimately, can other larger
entities.  Thus in all ‘directions’ from our original focal entity lie ‘things’ that are
alternately focal or subsidiary, and explicitly or tacitly known at any one moment in
time.
Granted then that any focal entity is ‘surrounded’ by tacitly known particulars of yet
‘larger’ tacitly known entities, and is itself composed of tacitly known particulars,
tacit knowledge is always present ‘in’ and ‘around’ the focal entity, as Polanyi
claimed.  If, however, for any given focal entity at a particular time and place you
know that you have explicit knowledge of all the other associated entities (i.e. the
particulars of that entity, and the sister entities that are particulars of another whole),
then for practical purposes you could quite reasonably claim that all knowledge about
the situation was known explicitly, although it might not necessarily all be held ‘in
mind’ at the same instant in time. His model thus seems to contain a contradiction that
is fatal to his insistence on the pervasiveness of tacit (i.e. wholly unspecified)
knowledge, or at least it could be read as meaning that the ‘problem’ of managing
tacit knowledge is far less difficult that the above account would suggest.
Throughout his writing on tacit knowledge Polanyi was especially concerned with this problem of
integrating particulars into a whole, and argued that this process itself was only known tacitly.  This
could be taken as an argument then, that although the model might not preclude complete explicit
knowledge (for a particular time and place) of an entity, yet there still remains a tacit aspect.  But
this tacit element would refer to the process of knowing, not the knowledge itself, and surely it is
not necessary to know how you know in order to claim explicit knowledge of something?  Even if
this point were conceded the knowing process itself could presumably be treated as a focal entity.
There is no a priori case why it should not be known, unless you accept that Polanyi’s claim about
intrinsically mysterious human powers precludes enquiry into the knowing process.
It seems, therefore, that Polanyi’s concept is really one of tacit knowledge ‘in the long run’.  In so
far as he was concerned to argue against the claim that ‘science’ could produce objective
knowledge, in the sense of absolute, value-free and timeless knowledge (Polanyi, 1962, passim)
then he only needed to show that there is ‘always’ a tacit element.  But when we confine our
attention to particular places and particular times, it seems wholly consistent with his model to
claim that we can have explicit knowledge about a focal entity, its ‘environment’, and its inner parts
to such a degree that this state of affairs is indistinguishable from a claim to know completely and
explicitly.
Tacit knowledge in work and AI: a Wittgensteinian contribution
Discussion of tacit knowledge in work inspired by Wittgenstein’s later philosophy identified several
distinct types of knowledge as tacit, and concluded that tacit knowledge is fundamentally non-
explicable.  This research and debate took place in Sweden in the late 1980s in the context of
research into skilled work and discussion about the scope and implications of artificial intelligence.
These studies distinguished three types or forms of knowledge.  The first was theoretical or
propositional knowledge which is identical with explicit knowledge and will be discussed below.
The other two types of knowledge they called variously knowledge by experience, knowledge by
acquisition or knowledge of familiarity, and practical knowledge or know-how (Josefson et.al.,
1982:69; Göranzon, 1988: 16-17; Janik, 1988).  These two types are all related to tacit knowledge.
Janik and Göranzon differed in their description of knowledge of familiarity, the former saw it as
resulting from “sensuous experience” (Janik, 1988: 56), the latter described it as “knowledge that
we acquire from learning in practice by examining the examples of tradition” (Göranzon, 1988:16).
Göranzon also emphasised the importance of collectivity and interaction with others in the
formation of knowledge of familiarity.  Josefson (1988) and Gullers (1988), writing about nursing,
and manufacturing respectively, argued that knowledge of familiarity, and practical knowledge, are
interdependent, arising both from reflecting on experience, and interaction between more and less
experienced workers in a manner reminiscent of what was later called “situated learning” (Lave &
Wenger, 1991).  Since the term tacit knowledge is now used generally to refer to all kinds of
experiential knowledge (von Krogh & Roos, 1996:39-40), and Janik (1988) also regarded
knowledge of familiarity as a form of tacit knowledge, it seems useful to regard tacit knowledge as
comprising several distinct forms, or having several names that actually all refer to the same thing.
Janik (1988) argued that the term tacit knowledge is used in two senses: first, to refer to knowledge
that could be made explicit, but which has not yet been so rendered; and second, to those “aspects of
human experience which are wholly knowable self-reflectively ... but by their very nature are
incapable of precise articulation” (Janik, 1988: 54).  The second sense he called the strict sense of
knowing tacitly (Janik, 1988: 56) which originates in two distinct types of experience or activity,
sensual experience, and rule-following.  In elaborating on these Janik drew on Wittgenstein’s later
philosophical ideas, particularly those concerning rule-following, and the role of practice.
A purely sensuous experience is one such as smelling coffee, or identifying a musical
instrument from the sound it makes.  Following Wittgenstein, Janik claimed that such
knowledge is impossible to put into words, or to convey to someone else, except by
subjecting them to the same experience.  As regards the “open-textured character of
rule-following behaviour” (Janik, 1988: 56) all human behaviour can be described as
rule-following, but rules can never be so precise or detailed that they suffice to guide
our actions fully.  We have in fact to learn how to accomplish something before we
know how to follow the rules for accomplishing the same goal.  The rules themselves
are always insufficient because we would require rules for following the rules, the
logic of which results in an infinite regress. Wittgenstein’s solution to this problem is
to say that ultimately rule-following always rests with actual doing, practice, or
activity (Janik, 1988: 57-8). Knowledge of how to follow the rules, whether tacitly
known, or explicit as in the form of propositional knowledge, can only come from
doing, following good examples, training, and interaction with other preferably more
experienced practitioners (Göranzon, 1988: 15; Josefson, 1988; see also Lave &
Wenger, 1991).  Tacit knowledge, therefore, is the primary form of all knowing in the
sense that all knowledge is tacit in origin, and there is always an irreducibly tacit
element to all knowing (Janik, 1988: 56; Gullers, 1988: 36).
Tacit knowledge - a conclusion
We should note that there is a long history of controversy among philosophers as to
the status and significance of ‘tacit knowledge’ and its synonyms, and its relationship
with ‘explicit knowledge’ (see Baumard, 1999: 30, 54-64, 104 for lists of several
other apparent synonyms).  Dewey (1938/1986: 145-6) argued that “immediate
knowledge” (equivalent to tacit knowledge) is better called “apprehension” and as
such clearly distinguished from ‘knowledge’ defined as “warranted assertion”.
Russell, in Problems of Philosophy (1912) contrasted “knowledge by acquaintance”
and “knowledge by description” while William James (1895, 1911) also used the
terms knowledge of acquaintance and immediate knowledge (equivalent to tacit
knowledge) and knowledge-about (i.e. explicit knowledge).  Grote (1865, 1900) wrote
at length on these distinctions, and the debate and discussion can be traced back even
further (Prosch, 1973).
Of course all these philosophers could have been mistaken, and Polanyi was perhaps
the first philosopher to make the link between tacit knowledge, and psychological
observations of learning experiments which identified subception or implicit learning.
While the concept of implicit learning is still contested many accept it as a genuine
facet of human behaviour (Buchner and Wippich, 1998; Frensch, 1998).  There is also
a considerable amount of research evidence to support the notion of non-conscious
acquisition of information that probably also has a bearing on the issue of tacit
knowledge (see Lewicki et.al, 1998). We must therefore accept the idea that some
form of ‘knowledge’ that cannot be made explicit (at least for the present) needs
taking seriously into account.
Polanyi’s discussion of tacit knowledge is, however, contradictory and confusing, for
reasons additional to those Harré (1977) noted.  Thus while he claimed that all
knowledge is either tacit, or based on tacit knowledge, his construct of
focal/subsidiary relations through which he elaborated and justified the term can also
be used to justify a claim to having, for all practical purposes, complete and explicit
knowledge.  It has been suggested that Wittgenstein’s position on tacit knowledge was
substantially the same as that of Polanyi (Gill, 1974). Wittgenstein, however,
produced good arguments, subsequently supported by studies of work and attempts to
automate skilled work (i.e. reduce knowledge to explicit rules), to substantiate a claim
that there is an irreducibly tacit aspect to all our knowing.
Nonaka and Takeuchi actually appear to have made little use of Polanyi beyond
borrowing the term ‘tacit knowledge’.  They believed that tacit knowledge can be
made explicit and indeed not only argued that it must be made explicit if it is to be of
any use to an organization but claimed that Japanese companies do make it explicit
(Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 11).  They recognized that articulating tacit knowledge
might not be easy but in so arguing, they ignored (or failed to recognize) that some
tacit knowledge is irreducibly tacit.  Polanyi and Wittgenstein also agreed that practice
is the source of tacit knowledge.  Nonaka and his colleagues appear to accept this as
regards skill, but also to see tacit knowledge as being learned by talking, and by
‘internalizing’ explicit knowledge.  If by this they meant that all relevant tacit
knowledge was put into words then their views are at odds with Polanyi’s and
Wittgenstein’s conception of tacit knowledge as being irreducibly inarticulable.  The
implications of their ambiguities for the knowledge creation ‘engine’ will be
considered below.
In the rest of this paper I use the phrase ‘tacit knowledge’ to mean knowledge that is
irreducibly tacit, and will distinguish this from a ‘weak’ tacit knowledge, meaning that
which is merely currently tacit, but which can be made explicit without much effort or
cost (see Baumard, 1999, 78-87 for discussion of these aspects).
Explicit knowledge
Explicit knowledge is knowledge that is in the form of words, spoken or recorded, or
in other intersubjectively understood symbolic form.  Explicit knowledge is what we
commonly refer to when speaking of ‘knowledge’.  It is also known by a number of
other names such as theoretical, propositional, thematized, migratory, articulated
knowledge (von Krogh & Roos, 1996: 39), declarative and codified knowledge
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 59,61).  Since it is expressed in commonly understood
symbols it is generally in a communicable form and as such can easily be separated
from the context in which it arose.   It consists of generally applicable rules and is
usually privileged over tacit knowledge as being scientific, verifiable, and objective
(Josefson et.al., 1982, Josefson, 1988; Göranzon, 1988; Gullers, 1988).
Nonaka & Takeuchi
Explicit knowledge and tacit knowledge were generally contrasted such that each was
defined in terms of the other.  Explicit or declarative knowledge is codified
knowledge that can take a number of forms - words, numbers, scientific formulae,
rules, and computer code within which it takes the ‘shape’ of metaphors, analogies,
and concepts (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 8, 59-61, 64).  Being in a systematic formal
language it is easily communicated, shared, and transmitted among people and by
electronic means.  Furthermore, it is objective, concerned with rationality and the
‘there and then’, and is theory oriented.  Explicit knowledge corresponds to the
traditional Western view of knowledge as being universal and objective.  Documents,
meetings, telephone conversations and computerized communications networks are
typical media through which explicit knowledge is exchanged and combined in
organizations (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 8, 11, 59, 61, 67).
Polanyi
Polanyi appears to have made little use of the term ‘explicit knowledge’ in his writing
on tacit knowledge.  He defined it in a passing comment as knowledge that is “capable
of being clearly stated” (Polanyi, 1966: 22) and implicitly identified it with
“theoretical knowledge”, “mathematical theory”, and with the “strictly detached
objective knowledge” associated with “exact science” (Polanyi, 1966: 20-21).
Elsewhere he referred to explicit knowledge as spoken words, formulae, maps and
graphs (Polanyi, 1969c:195).  By way of an implicit contrast with tacit knowledge,
explicit knowledge could be defined as that ‘knowledge that we can tell’ where ‘tell’
means to put into intersubjectively meaningful symbols.  Grene similarly talked of
explicit knowledge as being crystallized in words, pictures, formulae and “other
articulate devices” (Grene, 1969: xv), and referred to explicit knowing as being the
mastery of an intellectual discipline (Grene, 1969: x).
In Personal Knowledge, Polanyi gave much consideration to the concept of
articulation that has an important bearing on this issue (Polanyi, 1962: Chapter 5).
Language, he claimed, is an instrument for articulation, and it is language use that
serves to separate humans with their “formalized intelligence” from animals which
only have “inarticulate intelligence” (Polanyi, 1962: 69-70, 77).  Animals and humans
engage in three modes of learning - invention, observation, and interpretation.  For
humans, however, the ‘articulate forms’ of learning are manifested in patents, the
subjects of engineering and technology, and the natural sciences (corresponding to the
three modes of learning).  The highest of the articulate forms is mathematical
knowledge (Polanyi, 1962: 76).  There is thus “a sequence of increasing
formalization” from the descriptive to the exact, and then to the deductive sciences
(Polanyi, 1962: 86).  In his account there is a clear correspondence between that which
has been articulated, and the notion of explicit knowledge.  Consistently with his later
emphasis on tacit knowledge, throughout his discussion of articulation Polanyi
repeatedly returns to the theme that humans’ use of symbols “ultimately” rests on
unformalized intelligence (Polanyi, 1962: 82), and that all descriptions of experience
rely on a “tacit coefficient” to resolve indeterminateness (Polanyi, 1962: 86-7, 95).
A question of names
Before turning to evaluate the knowledge-creation matrix we need to consider the
appropriateness our key terms, tacit knowledge, and explicit knowledge.  Use of these
two terms implies that we are concerned with two forms of the same thing,
knowledge.  We have already seen Dewey’s (1938/1986) proposal that they should be
distinguished as being different things, and need to consider whether this should be
followed up, and if so, what names might we use.
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995: 58) said that the traditional western definition of
knowledge is “justified true belief”.  This definition has, however, been criticized
since at least the time of Plato because it raises the question of ‘justifiers’, and how
their justification can itself be justified, a situation of infinite regress (Brown, 1994).
Moreover, although Nonaka and Takeuchi claimed to have adopted this definition,
with some changes of emphasis, in the same section they also defined knowledge as
“a ... process of justifying personal belief toward the “truth”.” (Nonaka & Takeuchi,
1995:58).  Here then is another ambiguity in their account: knowledge is apparently
both a kind of belief, and a process of justifying a belief.  
Dewey (1938/1986: 15) also pointed out that ‘belief’ and ‘knowledge’ are ambiguous
words since belief can either name what is believed, or refer to a personal matter or
position, a mental state while ‘knowledge’ can refer to the terminus of inquiry, or
something that has meaning of its own apart from inquiry.  Neither ‘belief’ or
‘knowledge’ (in an unqualified sense) are useful words to use when we are trying to
gain some precision of understanding on just how ‘knowledge’ is created so that we
might seek to manage the process.  One solution would be to adopt Dewey’s
definition of knowledge as warranted assertion, giving us ‘tacit warranted assertion’,
and ‘explicit warranted assertion’.  It is however difficult to conceive of a tacit
assertion, let alone one that is warranted, since both words imply some degree of
explicitness that is ruled out by the very term tacit knowledge.  It may have been
thinking along these lines that made Dewey suggest they are not two kinds of
‘knowledge’, but two different things related to knowing, or understanding.  Thus we
might adopt his view, and replace ‘tacit knowledge’ by ‘apprehension’, and call
explicit knowledge ‘warranted assertion’.
While this would provide some conceptual clarity it has the drawback of eliminating
the term ‘tacit knowledge’ which is much in vogue.  Moreover, Dewey himself later
abandoned his attempt to define knowledge precisely, and wrote that ‘knowledge’ is
“No. 1 on a list of “vague words”” (Dewey and Bentley, 1949:48).  A different
solution to the question of names can be drawn from writing on situated cognition and
in particular the work of Clancey, an expert in AI and expert systems design.  
Clancey defined knowledge as the “capacity to interact, to reflect, to innovate.”
(1995 :12); “to coordinate and sequence behavior” (1997:3); the “capacity to engage
in an activity” (1997:19).  As befitting a capacity, knowledge is conceptualized in
dynamic terms: the appropriate metaphor is not of something that can be possessed,
but rather “energy” (Clancey, 1995:2;, 1997:6).  From this perspective he argued that
knowledge is “dynamically constructed as we conceive of what is happening to us,
speak, and move” (Clancey, 1997:7).  Knowing occurs in the process of acting
(Sierhuis & Clancey, 1997), and knowledge “corresponds to conceptualizing and
other representing processes in the brain” (Clancey, 1997: 26).  As a process in the
brain, knowledge is simultaneously “inherently “neural” in form.” and “inherently
social in content” (Clancey, 1997: 14, fn 5) because it develops with respect to
activities, which are themselves socially constructed (Clancey, 1997:3).  This
perspective is consistent with other contemporary views on knowledge and knowing
that emphasise knowledge as ‘embodied’ (e.g. Varela et.al., 1991; Lakoff and
Johnson, 1999).
Clancey argued that artefacts such as books, maps, instructions, goal statements, and
so on, that we typically refer to as ‘knowledge’ are better called representations of
knowledge (Clancey, 1995: 2-4).  Representations of knowledge, and knowledge, are
distinct, not equivalent or interchangeable, and not different types of a common entity.
Knowledge representations are tools for inquiry that lie, speaking figuratively,
‘between’ performances – the past performance that is reflected on, and the future
performance toward which end ‘knowing’ is directed (Clancey, 1997: 11-12; see also
the discussion by Keller and Keller, 1993).  From this perspective, knowledge itself,
in so far as it is a ‘thing’, is ‘in’ the performances, as has been indicated in the
preceding paragraph.
There are two types of knowledge representation, internal, and external (Clancey,
1997: 11, 14, fn. 4). Internal representations are internal to an individual’s brain, and
take two forms – conscious representations, and unconscious representations.
Conscious representations are those we use in “imagined experiences” (Clancey,
1997: 28) when we think through something, consciously representing it to ourselves.
Subconscious representing occurs during conceptualization, the neural process at the
heart of knowing (Clancey, 1997: 14, fn. 4). Clancey argues that internal representing
is “coupled such that perception, movement, and conceptualization are changing with
respect to each other moment-by-moment” (Clancey, 1997: 12). External
representations on the other hand are things such as books, computer files, and so on -
those things we commonly refer to as ‘knowledge’.
This suggests that the term ‘explicit knowledge’ could be abandoned, and replaced by
a more accurate descriptor: knowledge representation, referring in particular to
external representations.  This name also points to another potentially interesting
source of research and theorizing, namely, work on representing and representations
(see e.g. Stufflebeam, 1998; Billman, 1998). The name ‘tacit knowledge’ can be
retained to mean knowledge that cannot (at the present time and place) be made
explicit.  Polanyi’s notion of ‘foreknowledge’ will be excluded from consideration as
too imprecise, and conjuring up notions of mysterious powers of mind. The ‘weak’
version of tacit knowledge is of no particular concern since its conversion to
knowledge representations is taken care of by the representing process.
Knowledge conversion – a critical review
We can finally turn to subjecting the knowledge conversion matrix to critical scrutiny,
having clarified the meaning of tacit knowledge to refer to knowledge that is
irreducibly tacit, and replaced the term ‘explicit knowledge’ with ‘knowledge
representations’.
Socialization - tacit to tacit knowledge conversion
Knowledge conversion begins with socialization, a process of sharing experiences,
whereby, for example, one person or group shares their tacit knowledge with others,
thereby creating common tacit knowledge (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995:62).  Nonaka
and Takeuchi gave three illustrative examples.  The first concerned the “brainstorming
camp” which has already been discussed which they claimed was a particularly
effective type of activity for sharing and reorienting “mental models” (Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995:  11-12, 63).  The second example illustrated how a tacit skill could
be transferred: a team attempting to design a home baking machine only learned how
to make good bread by apprenticing themselves to a master baker, after which they
succeeded in developing automated technology.  Here, tacit knowledge was
transferred through “observation, imitation, and practice” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995:
63-4, 103-9).  Finally, they suggested that interaction between producers and
customers enables the producers to improve products through sharing experiences
with the users (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 64).
One problem with these examples, as was noted before, is the lack of detail which
makes them difficult to evaluate.  It is clear, however, that the first and third examples
involve talking, with the implication that tacit knowledge was transmitted through the
talk.  If, however, tacit knowledge is by definition not expressible in words, these
cannot be examples of the acquisition of tacit knowledge. Talk can play a role in the
transfer of tacit knowledge, provided we make explicit the idea that language
functions on more levels than that of representing knowledge.  
Shotter (1990: 120-21) argued that in fact we do not use language primarily to
represent the world.  Instead, our “ways of speaking” help us coordinate our diverse
activities with each other.  Thus we speak in order to create, maintain, reproduce and
transform social relationships rather than to represent facts.  From this perspective it
would be perfectly permissible to envisage the transfer of tacit knowledge through
speech since that knowledge would be ‘in’ the speaking; but the talk could not be
about what was known tacitly.  (Talk could perhaps be used explicitly to convey tacit
knowledge by a skilled rhetorician, but this would be a special case).  Perhaps this is
what Nonaka and Takeuchi meant to say through these examples, and in claiming that
this kind of interaction is particularly effective for ‘cognitive’ tacit knowledge
exchange, but they do not actually make this point, and we can only evaluate what
they have written.  In any case, the talk in their examples took place off the job, not on
it, and it may therefore only have had a rhetorical function with regard to socializing,
not to designing since it was divorced from the latter practice.
Is ‘transfer’ of ‘knowledge’ that is fully tacit, and remains so in the transfer process,
possible?  A study of classroom teaching and learning (Edwards and Mercer, 1987)
suggested that it is. This showed that children learn two kinds of implicit rule of how
to behave in the classroom, and how to construct knowledge from the lessons they
receive.  These rules were rarely if ever made explicit by the teacher, and Edwards and
Mercer commented that it is likely the teachers themselves were not aware of what
they are doing in this respect (1987:59-60). Indeed, a particularly striking aspect of
this study was that the teachers intended not to inculcate any such rules of conduct.
Edwards and Mercer concluded that tacit or implicit knowledge is thus intrinsically
social, and cultural, and constructed through joint activity and discourse (1987: 160-
3), the latter term reflecting the rhetorical aspect of language use noted above.  Lave
and Wenger’s (1991) concepts of “situated learning” and a “situated curriculum”
whereby people learn through experience and reflection, but not necessarily direct
instruction, also helps indicate how tacit to tacit knowledge transmission occurs, as
does the concept of implicit learning (Buchner and Wippich, 1998; Frensch, 1998).
So far as the transfer of tacit knowledge without language is concerned, only the
bakery case seems to qualify as a genuine example of tacit to tacit knowledge transfer.
Here we are told that the people observing or participating in the bread making
process noticed a “twisting” action of the master chef that they concluded made all the
difference to the final product (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 64). The precise nature of
this technique apparently remained unarticulated even when incorporated into the
automatic process.  This example might actually be a more apt case of tacit to tacit
knowledge transfer (or simply an example of a fortuitous accident) than Nonaka and
his colleagues realise.  The flavour of hand-made bread has nothing to do with any
special “twisting” process but is due to the fermentation process and time (David,
1977: 110).  Assuming the team did replicate the flavour of the chef-made bread, this
was probably because in experimenting with designs, they altered the nature of the
fermentation process.
The emphasis in the transfer or exchange of tacit knowledge must therefore be on the
non-verbal dimensions of such learning, on subception (Polanyi, 1969b: 142-3) or
implicit learning (Buchner and Wippich, 1998; Frensch, 1998) in which words have,
at best, ‘only’ a rhetorical function. On the basis of the examples discussed here, there
may be at least two ways in which this occurs.  First, as evidenced by the classroom
study, there is a repeated transaction over time involving people in a particular
institutional setting (that must also be defined to include other others not present in
the particular situation observed, such as the classroom).  Tacit knowledge is
transferred / learned as an intrinsic part of this transaction but without the necessity of
any conscious intention by the learners (or ‘teachers’) to learn or impart what is
actually learned. For the children, classroom behaviour in its widest sense (i.e.
including how to construct knowledge from the teaching process) is something they
learn without conscious intent. Here, transfer depends on participation in a shared
activity that itself was not explicitly concerned with transferring that particular tacit
knowledge, but with something else (such a learning lessons).
The second way in which tacit knowledge may be transferred is when one individual
observes another, imitates their actions in an attempt to replicate the results, and
develops an understanding of how to do something through reflecting on their
experience as they do it, or in subsequent recollection (e.g. Perby, 1988).  This
happens, for example, when novices imitate experts in an apprenticeship-like
situation. The novice presumably consciously intends to seek through imitation and
practice to identify for herself that elusive ‘something’ that the expert is aware of.
The expert in turn may be trying consciously to direct her pupil’s attention towards
something she cannot express in words, or that requires more than words (i.e.,
practice) to fully understand. Confirmation /disconfirmation of having achieved that
identification is made, and can only be made, in practice, and by interacting with the
expert - a process of trial and error.
From tacit knowledge to knowledge representations - “externalization”
The next step after socialization in the process of knowledge creation is the
transformation of tacit into explicit knowledge through the process of
“externalization”.  Externalization, claimed Nonaka and Takeuchi, is “a quintessential
knowledge-creation process” that is the key to knowledge creation, because it is here
that new concepts are created although despite this status it is rather a neglected
concept (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 62, 64-6).  Their exemplars of  conceptual
knowledge all relate to novel commercial “concepts” - a new model of car, and a
photocopier. Externalization is seen as a process of working from metaphors through
analogies to new models. The idea for a new sports car was derived from seeking to
operationalize the car maker’s corporate slogan; the metaphor of “evolution” led other
car designers to develop the “tall car”; and an empty beer can inspired a photocopier
designer team to develop a radical new product with a disposable ink cartridge
(Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 64-7). 
One difficulty with this account is that the notion of transforming tacit knowledge into
knowledge representations implies, first, that this tacit knowledge is ‘weak’ tacit
knowledge, and second, that it is clearly known, though not yet articulated.  Ryle
(1963: 214-7) provides an interesting example of how a claim to knowledge that could
not be made explicit could be tested – by getting the claimant to do something that
would illustrate and substantiate their claim to knowledge.  In these instances,
however, we appear to be dealing with situations in which a group constructs a new
idea through interaction, practice, and talking and something new by definition did not
exist before.  Unless Nonaka and Takeuchi wished to invoke Polanyi’s notion of
“foreknowledge” we are forced to question whether these are example of the process
of representing hitherto tacit knowledge.  Indeed, it would be simpler to view them as
examples of ‘creative’ teamworking through which new product and design ideas are
constructed by complex social transactions.  While those ideas might be called
‘concepts’, it is questionable whether they are of the same type as concepts in the
sense of knowledge that emerges from the processes of systematic investigation.  This
is an issue that requires further investigation and clarification.
Nonaka and Takeuchi also used the term “externalization” to refer to the setting down
of tacit experiential knowledge (1995: 69).  This is certainly more in keeping with the
idea of making representations of hitherto tacit knowledge.  Unfortunately they do not
provide us with any examples.  Besides, we have already seen that if tacit knowledge
can be made explicit it can only have been ‘weak’ tacit knowledge.  Their examples of
customer-producer interaction, and the brainstorming camp (on the basis of what they
tell us about those processes) probably constitute examples of tacit knowledge
representing processes rather than of tacit to tacit knowledge transfer.
What might be taking place when (if) tacit knowledge is successfully ‘converted’ into
knowledge representations, or perhaps more accurately, when a knowledge
representation is created of a portion of tacit knowledge?  It is interesting to note that
in an early version of the matrix, Nonaka (1990, cited in Baumard, 1999:24) had
called this cell of the matrix ‘articulation’.  This might have been a better name,
reflecting, for example, Polanyi’s term, and thus linking the process with a wider
literature.  It is not clear why he later substituted “externalization”.  If we assume that
the creation of internal (Clancey, 1997: 11, 14) or mental (Ramsey, 1992)
representations is the first step from tacit knowledge to external representation, then
as Ramsey (1992) and others (Stufflebeam, 1998; Clark, 1997) show, this is a
complex set of processes, both cognitive and social, the precise nature of which is
highly contentious.  There is not space here to enter into further discussion, but suffice
it to say that a more accurate descriptor than “externalization” would be
‘representing’.  
“Combination” - the ‘joining’ of knowledge representations
Combination, follows “externalization” (or, representing) and is “a process of
systemizing concepts into a knowledge system” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 67, 72).
According to Nonaka and Takeuchi combination occurs when individuals meet and
exchange and combine explicit knowledge through various media, such as documents,
meetings, and conversations.  They also asserted that new knowledge can arise from
the sorting, combining and categorizing of explicit knowledge, and claimed that this is
the primary mode of knowledge development in formal education.  Combination can
also occur within computer systems when data is sorted and combined in databases. 
Given the argument that ‘explicit knowledge’ should be replaced by ‘knowledge
representations’, the concept of ‘combination’ poses considerable difficulties.
Knowledge representations are symbols, or collections of symbols, and it is of course
possible to combine symbols themselves, by means of other symbols. Computer
databases are created in this way but the critical symbols are those initially specified
by people to ensure that the computers perform humanly meaningful tasks.
‘Combination’ might therefore perhaps make sense in the limited and special case of
entirely automated combination processes within computers, even though these cannot
be understood without the human dimension.  Human beings on the other hand are not
equipped to process knowledge representations (and there is even debate as to whether
there are such things as internal representations - see Clark 1997).  Moreover, it is a
caricature of educational systems to suggest that people become educated simply by
‘processing’ knowledge representations.  
Human beings can in fact only combine knowledge representations first by
‘internalizing’, then by ‘externalizing’ or making further new representations, to use
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s terms.  Formal education involves among many other
processes reading books and writing summaries or notes, perhaps linking ideas in one
book with those from another.  Thus in human beings and probably in organizations,
‘combination’ does not seem to be a distinct process, but is an iterative linking of
internalization and representing.  Since the matrix is intended to indicate four distinct
modes of knowledge conversion it is not possible to maintain combination as a
distinct mode when it simply encompasses two other modes.
Combination, meaning the joining together (in some sense) of knowledge
representations can only occur with a meaningful outcome if the process is carried on
under human instruction, whether direct, or indirect (e.g. as through a computer
program).  In this way the bringing together of disparate sets of symbols to create a
new and potentially more useful set is possible, and commonplace.  Everyday
examples are the creation of databases, and the development and maintenance of
libraries. From this perspective, ‘combination’ should more accurately if less
glamorously be called ‘information management’, the methods and processes of
managing knowledge representations (Burke and Horton, 1988; Orna, 1990).
“Internalization” - from knowledge representations to tacit knowledge
The final step in the knowledge conversion spiral is internalization, the process of
“embodying explicit knowledge into tacit knowledge” which is “closely related to
“learning by doing.”” (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995: 69).  They claimed that
internalization is facilitated “if knowledge is verbalized or diagrammed into
documents, manuals, or oral stories”.  Documents seem in their account to perform a
double function, of “enriching tacit knowledge” and facilitating “the transfer of
explicit knowledge”.  It is not clear whether the production, or consumption (or both)
of documents is what helps these processes.  Reading or listening to stories, however,
was suggested as an important method of internalization facilitating changes in tacit
mental models because it helps people to “feel the realism and essence of ... the
experience” of others in such a way that in reading, people may change their mental
models without having actually to have the experiences themselves (Nonaka &
Takeuchi, 1995: 69-70).  
It seems clear from their examples that by ‘internalization’ Nonaka and Takeuchi
intended to focus attention on ‘learning’.  There seem to be two distinct processes in
their account and examples of ‘internalization’.  First is ‘learning by doing’ which is
relatively straightforward. Nonaka and Takeuchi described how people developed an
understanding of what a reduced working year would be like by working for one
month at the new annual rate (an example that makes sense for people working
annualized rather than daily, weekly or monthly hours (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995:
70)).
The second process is learning through reading and the use of other kinds of
knowledge representation.  Once again, there are some difficulties with this concept in
terms of their own model.  If, as they sometimes emphasised, tacit knowledge is
created by action and experience learning by doing makes sense but learning by
reading does not.  Indeed, the very idea of ‘turning’ knowledge representations
directly into tacit knowledge is highly questionable.  If tacit knowledge is a ‘product’
of (or better, integral to) practice then it must arise in practice, and cannot be reduced
to anything else.  Indeed the ‘consumption’ of knowledge representations is itself a
practice and so the only tacit knowledge that can be generated by ‘internalization’ is
that relating to the consumption of knowledge representations.  The tacit knowledge
integral to practices that the knowledge representations are intended to represent
cannot simply be ‘transferred’ by working with or on the representations.  You only
need to consider the gap between what is learned from reading instructions and what
you actually need to know in order to do something to accept this point.
One way of making sense of this notion is to see it as the process of making use of
knowledge representations prior to engaging, literally, in some practice.  Keller and
Keller (1993) provide an account of craft iron-working that illustrates this. Preparing
to make a something ‘in the spirit’ of a 19th century kitchen implement involved
examining historical examples, reviewing knowledge representations about the tools
(historical records, studies of previous making of similar tools), and evaluating
materials, skills, and production constraints (Keller and Keller, 1993:130-35).  In this
way “an umbrella plan, an internal representation of goal and procedure” (Keller and
Keller, 1993: 135) could be formed which was subsequently modified in the course of
the manufacturing process during which “reorganizations of knowledge and action
take place” (Keller & Keller, 1993: 135).  These external and internal knowledge
representations enabled them “to conceptualize an orientation toward a goal: to
provide a combinatorial arrangement of previous knowledge in the service of a new,
and therefore partially unknown, production” (Keller and Keller, 1993: 141).  The
tacit knowledge aspects of actually working iron were only re-awakened in the
practice itself, and it was only after having completed this task, or had this experience,
that the full extent of required knowledge was apparent: “what one needs to know ...
becomes a product of behaving” (Keller & Keller, 1993: 141).  Interaction with the
implement-in-the-making, tacit-to-tacit knowledge transfer across time (within the
same individual) and internal representing, shaped the next act on a ‘moment-by-
moment basis’.
This account suggests that external representations facilitate a form of remembering,
and the creation of an ‘internal’ ‘picture’ or account of what might happen.  As Marx
wrote, “The architect will construct in his imagination that which he will ultimately
erect in reality.  At the end of every labour process, we get that which existed in the
consciousness of the labourer at its commencement” (Marx, 1974, cited in Cooley,
1980: 27).  This internal representation, in whatever form it occurs, is clearly quite
different in origin, and most likely also different in nature, from the tacit knowledge
acquired by actually engaging in a practice.  The process of ‘internalization’ thus also
appears far more complex than Nonaka and Takeuchi give credit for, as does the
question of how knowledge representations are (if at all) related ‘back’ to the practices
from which they arose in the first place.
‘Consuming’ knowledge representations in preparation for an activity or practice
involves complex processes of remembering and reminding; of metaphorical
experiencing (i.e. in practices not previously experienced, reminding cannot happen,
but metaphors might be a powerful way of creating a ‘virtual reality’ world in which
the desired practice can be envisaged on the basis of other implicitly similar
experiences).  It might also involve creating ‘internal’ representations for an activity-
being-planned.  If this account is a better representation (!) of what ‘internalization’
might refer to, then it is again apparent that it indicates a more complex set of psycho-
social processes than Nonaka and Takeuchi’s account suggested.
Conclusion
Nonaka and Takeuchi’s knowledge-conversion matrix has provided a focus for
enquiry debate and thought, but it is ultimately flawed in its present form.  Their
conceptualization of tacit knowledge is ambiguous and lacks clarity, as does their
concept of knowledge.  It is widely agreed that tacit knowledge is by definition not
expressible in words and is an irreducible aspect of all knowing.  This means that tacit
to tacit knowledge transfer cannot use words to convey the knowledge itself.  Words
might play a part in such transfers but only as rhetoric, not as representing.  The neo-
Taylorist vision of making tacit knowledge explicit (Nonaka & Takeuchi 1995: 11;
Myers 1996) thus freeing the organization of its troublesome employees must remain
a dream.  Their definition of explicit knowledge is less problematic but it was
suggested that a better term would be ‘knowledge representation’.
The consequences of this re-conceptualization for the knowledge conversion matrix
are shown in Figure 2:
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Nonaka and Takeuchi only provide one firm example of tacit to tacit knowledge
conversion and it appears that was a more tacit transfer process than they realised.
Other examples provided in this paper, and the link made with implicit learning, show
that it is a well documented process although the precise nature is subject to much
debate. The name socialization was retained for tacit to tacit knowledge transfer since
it seems quite appropriate, and links this aspect with similarly named social processes
(see e.g. van Maanen and Schein 1979; Bauer et.al. 1998).
Their discussion of the making of knowledge representations from tacit knowledge
also lacks clarity.  Here a key issue is the question of the similarity of new product
“concepts” with what is more usually thought of as a concept in the context of
knowledge.  Some of their examples of tacit to tacit knowledge conversion are more
appropriate to this mode of knowledge conversion.  Even so, the link made to research
on representing suggests they have understated the complexity of social and
psychological processes involved in making representations of tacit knowledge.  It
was suggested that this cell be renamed ‘representing’ in order to draw attention to the
link with this wider literature.
Since knowledge representations cannot interact meaningfully with each other (and
still cannot without human intervention) the cell labelled ‘combination’ has to be
radically reconceptualized.  Two possibilities were indicated: first that it is a name for
the iterative linking of ‘representing’ and ‘internalizing’, and second, that it should be
treated as an entirely separate process, information management.  It cannot remain a
cell of a matrix where it actually encompasses two other cells of the same matrix.
‘Combination’ has thus been renamed information management, and is depicted as a
separate process, linked to representing (from where its objects come) and
internalization (where representations are used).  ‘Combination’ as an interative
linking of representing and internalization bypassing information management is
indicated by the double-headed arrow.
Finally, internalization seems to stand in for ‘learning’, but the term Nonaka and
Takeuchi used has been retained for the present.  It is important here though to
recognize again that internalization involves more complex psychological and social
processes than their account would indicate.  Moreover, it is difficult if not impossible
to see internalization as providing a direct means of tacit knowledge acquisition.  It is
rather the process of ‘consuming’ in some sense knowledge representations.
The implications of this revised model for knowledge management are that we now
have two clear processes and foci of action.  On the one hand we have the three
processes socialization, representing, and internalization, that are all centred on
people, their interactions with each other, and with their work.  Tacit knowledge, in
particular, can only be managed through managing people and their relations in the
organization.  On the other hand we have information management, concerned with
storing, manipulating, and managing knowledge representations.  Knowledge
management activities seem, by and large, to have concentrated on the latter.  Perhaps
it is time to look more to the former in order to complete the ‘circle’ of managing
knowledge creation processes.
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